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FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DISPUTED MARITIME ZONES: MARITIME DISPUTES
AS EVENTS OF FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
Abstract
Sovereign rights in Exclusive economic zones and Continental shelves are functionally limited to the
economic exploitation of these zones. Moreover, in the case of disputed maritime zones these sovereign
rights are neither exclusive nor necessarily constant. Nevertheless, states are still expected to provide the
investments established in these zones the same treatment they should provide in their territories where
they exercise full and constant sovereignty. If a host state agrees to the establishment of an investment
in a maritime zone that become later contested, do the occurrence of the contestation and the hazards
arising from such contestation relief the host state from its contractual and treaty obligations toward
the investment by virtue of the force majeure concept. This paper argues that a traditional interpretation
of the force majeure concept in respect of investment agreements and contracts, hampers states ability
to de-escalate their maritime disputes, diminishes its capacity to conclude delimitation agreements and
reduces the promotion of the UNCLOS III as well as its mechanisms for disputes settlement. It proposes
a contextualist interpretation of the force majeure concept that is adapted to the exploitation of disputed
maritime zones and states obligations under the international law of the sea. First, it examines the concept
of force majeure as a doc-trinal hypothesis and its applications in international contracts and international
in-vestment agreements. Second, it analyzes the legal act of maritime contestation as a force majeure
event according to the possible interpretations of the concept of “force majeure”. Finally, it examines the
recurrent legal implications susceptible of arising out of a contestation; provisional orders and unfavorable
delimitation and their qualifica-tion as a force majeure event in the realm of investment agreements and
contract.
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INTRODUCTION *
The regime of foreign investments is built upon an assumption that the sovereignty of host
states creates an imbalance in the relation between the later and foreign investors. The host state
being far more powerful than the investor is once the investment agreement is made.1 Hence, the
need to a legal regime capable of providing foreign investments the adequate protection against a
possible misusage of a host state’s sovereignty.2 This legal regime covers foreign investments
wherever a host state exercises sovereignty or jurisdiction, including in maritime zones where host
states exercise sovereign rights.3
Contrarily to territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights in Exclusive economic zones and
Continental shelves are functionally limited to the economic exploitation of these zones.4 Moreover,
in the case of disputed maritime zones these sovereign rights are neither exclusive nor necessarily
constant. Two claimant States of a single maritime zone are both presumed to be entitled to
economically exploit the disputed zone until the reaching of a final agreement.5 The exploitation is
subject to procedural and substantive limitations, which aim to preserve the chances of reaching a
final delimitation agreement.6
The interaction between the legal regime of foreign investments on the one hand and the legal
regime of disputed maritime zones on the other hand is not an evident question. Foreign
investments regime provides foreign investments protection and legal stability within the territory
of a sovereign host state,7 while the second temporarily governs the competing claims and sovereign
rights of more than one state. A disputed maritime zone generates rights, which are inherently
temporary and limited. Nevertheless, states are still expected to provide the investments established
in these zones the same guarantees they should provide in their territory where they exercise full
and constant sovereignty.8
Hence arises the main question the thesis addresses. If a host state agrees to the
establishment of an investment in a maritime zone that become later contested, do the occurrence of
the contestation and the hazards arising from such contestation relief the host state from its
contractual and treaty obligations toward the investment.

This article is based on an LL.M. thesis defended by the author in the American University in Cairo (2019)
and supervised by Prof. Dr. Thomas Skouteris, Chair of the department of law, GAPP, The American
University in Cairo.
1
I. ALVIK, CONTRACTING WITH SOVEREIGNTY: STATE CONTRACTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2
(2011).
2
Christopher M Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of
International Investment Law, 29 37.
3
Odysseas G. Repousis, On Territoriality and International Investment Law: Applying China’s Investment
Treaties To Hong Kong And Macao, 37 MICH J INTL L 113, 123–126 (2015).
4
Y. TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 130–151 (2015), Lea - Brilmayer & Natalie - Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search of a Common Denominator, - N. Y. UNIV. J. INT. LAW
POLIT. 703.
5
Oil and Gas Development in Disputed Waters under UNCLOS, , J. LAW JURISPRUD., 64 (2016); Rainer
Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, 78 AM. J. INT. LAW 345, 349–354
(1984).
6
Lagoni, supra note 5 at 69.
7
K.N. SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS, SECOND EDITION 271–
360 (2016).
8
Marianthi Pappa, The Impact of Judicial Delimitation on Private Rights Existing in Contested Waters:
Implications for the Somali-Kenyan Maritime Dispute, 61 J. AFR. LAW 393–418 (2017).

This question is driven by concerns regarding how these seemingly opposing regimes
operates hand in hand.9 Two interests are supposed to coexist in the realm of foreign investments in
disputed maritime zones, the protection of foreign investments on the one hand and the peaceful
resolution of maritime disputes. However, the balance between these two interests does not seem
guaranteed.
Generally, the regime of investment protection has been observed to adopt a tendency to
prioritize the interests of investors over other rights of host states and the functions of international
law.10
This tendency is reflected in some overlapping observations. Foreign investors are given
clear rights through international law by means of investment agreements and customary
international law. However, it does not seem that foreign investors are bound by clear obligations
towards host states or under international law.11 Moreover, while states as subjects of international
law are bound by international legal obligations capable of limiting their capacity to honor their
contractual agreements, investors are relatively free from such bounds under the assumption that
they do not have legal personality in international law.12 Accordingly, the obligations arising from
the investment’s protection regime are often falling on the host state’s side, affecting state’s
sovereignty and its regulatory authority.13 States capability to enter in international agreements14 as
well as instigating internal policies15 is perceived to be largely hampered by the fear of conflicting
with foreign investors’ expectations.
The problems that are noticeable from a political approach are also perceivable from a
formalist or positivist approach. The inherent nature of disputed maritime zones as areas subjected
to unstable sovereign rights until the dispute resolution, as well as the hazards which may arise from
the disputes like possible provisional measures by competent tribunals or the reaching of agreement
transferring the disputed zone to a contesting state, make the disputed zone permanently subjected
to events that would qualify as events of force majeure. In fact, investment agreements and
contracts generally refer to events of that nature as events of force majeure susceptible of precluding
wrongfulness in case of the un-fulfillment of the party’s obligations.
This paper demonstrates that approached with a traditional interpretation, the concept of force
majeure as contained in investment agreements and contracts collides with the purpose of
peacefully settling maritime zonal disputes. Host states become bound by investment agreements
that might prevent them from providing the necessary concessions in order to resolve their maritime
disputes. These concessions are required whether in the context of delimitation agreements or in the
context of governing the overlapping of maritime claims between multiple states. Moreover, in
order to benefit from “force majeure” clauses; host states and investors are not obliged by the same
standards and obligations despite being parties to one investment agreement. States must abide by
the regulations of the law of the sea in respect of their maritime disputes, while investors are only
bound by their agreement with the host states. Additionally, the force majeure concept as
traditionally interpreted is susceptible of discouraging states from adhering to the United Nations
convention on the law of the sea and its mechanisms of dispute resolution.
9
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A host state can be considered to have triggered an event hampering the investment in case of
a subsequent adherence to the convention or its mechanisms after the establishment of the
investment if such adherence led to the latter is suspension.
This paper provides an understanding of the force majeure concept that balances the interests
of private foreign investments on the one hand and the necessities of peaceful resolution of
maritime disputes on the other hand. It proposes a contextualist and subjective interpretation of the
concept of force majeure that is based upon what the parties of an agreement have agreed to be
bound to, according to the provisions of the legal regime governing the exploitation of disputed
maritime zones and the purpose of peaceful resolution of maritime disputes.
It provides this understanding using instruments, which are already existent in international
investment agreements and contracts. Most long-term investments adopt a relaxed approach of the
force majeure concept. A similar policy can also be traced in some bilateral investment agreements.
Approaching the force majeure concept from such perspective creates a certain balance between
investor’s need to legal stability for promoting their investments and state’s need to maneuverability
to peacefully resolve their maritime disputes.
The first part examines the doctrine of force majeure and its function. This part is divided
into three sections; the first deconstructs the concept of force majeure to deduct its elements
considering its different interpretations in multiple legal systems. The second inspects international
law instruments, namely bilateral investment treaties’ approach of the concept of force majeure. The
third studies the common elements of the notion of force majeure in long-term investment contracts,
focusing on maritime investment contracts.16 This research has been based upon the study of
twenty-nine maritime investments related contracts. All these contracts are different sorts of
petroleum agreements. Twenty-six out of them are directly or indirectly related to maritime
disputes. This sample is widespread on different geographical areas and governing legal systems.
The relevant areas of these contracts cover disputed maritime zones in the Caribbean Sea, the South
China Sea, East Mediterranean, West African shores. The investors parties to these contracts are
resortissants of several nations bounded with the host states by different BITs. Most of these areas
have witnessed incidents related to maritime disputes that have affected foreign investments. Some
of these incidents have been brought to investment tribunals17 and some of these maritime disputes
have been subject to international adjudication.
Part two discusses the qualification of a maritime dispute or contestation as an event of force
majeure. It demonstrates that different interpretations of each element of the force majeure leads to
different outcomes in respect of host states’ obligations under the international law of the sea. The
first section explains the element of “impossibility to fulfill the obligation” and its relationship with
the state’s obligation not to hamper the final agreement. section two studies the element of
exteriority and the state’s duty to precede the economic activity with seeking to enter into a
provisional agreement. This section analyzes the failure of the state to fulfill this obligation as a
participation in the rise of the force majeure event. Part three inspects the element of predictability
in relation to the general rules of delimitation. It addresses the geographical location of the
investment and its relation to predictability in light the rules of delimitation.
Part three discusses the legal hazards emanating from a maritime contestation. The first
section examines the qualification of provisional measures banning the economic activity in the
disputed zone as an event of force majeure. The second section discusses the occurrence of an
unfavorable delimitation as an event of force majeure. This section proposes a contextualist
interpretation of force majeure that allows states a greater margin of maneuver to enter into
delimitation agreements and to adhere to the dispute resolution mechanisms proposed by the United
Nations convention of the law of the sea.
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I. FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS
The concept of force majeure is often presented as universal concept in the sense that most
legal regimes contain a mechanism allowing a party to be exonerated from an obligation if it
becomes impossible to perform.18 However, the constitutive elements of this concept
“unforeseeability, irresistibility and impossibility” differ in their interpretation from one legal
regime to another.19 Some legal regimes retain the three elements while others retain some of them.
Among the regimes adopting the concept of force majeure or a similar concept, the interpretation of
each element differs from one another. The governance of foreign investments is subject to several
legal regimes at a time.20 Host state’s national laws, international law and the investment contract
constitute the components of the legal regime governing the investment.
The relationship between a foreign investment and a host state usually begins with
negotiation then an agreement concerning the establishment of an economic activity or investment
according to the laws of the host state. However, this contractual relationship does not arise
unexpectedly. It does not live and operate within a legal vacuum independently from the laws of the
host state. It is the host state’s national law that regulates the principle of “the autonomy of the
parties” which give them the relative freedom to enter into a relationship that is governed by their
own laws, namely the law of the contract. It is also the national law of the host state (unless
otherwise agreed) that is going to govern the contractual relationship as well as disagreements as the
interpretation and the fulfillment of the contract’s provision.21
On the other hand, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important
instrument of investors/investment protection. They are the main source of international investment
treaty law. In contrast with diplomatic protection, these treaties provide investors the possibility of
raising claims against a sovereign state before international instances without the need of another
sovereign state to elevate its claim to the international plane. BITs contain the essential means of
protection of foreign investments and the standards that host states are obliged to follow when
dealing with the investments belonging to nationals of the other contracting state. These three legal
instruments govern foreign investments simultaneously. Each one of them governs the relation
between the investor and the host state before the relevant instance and they can interact with each
other before the same instance.
Therefore, it becomes impracticable to address the qualification of a maritime dispute as a
force majeure before establishing a definition of the concept that encompasses its meaning in those
regimes.22 This section tries to establish an understanding of force majeure that encompasses its
multiple interpretations in order to reach a universal definition for examining the question of
investments in disputed maritime zones. The focus of this section is national laws, investment
contracts and bilateral investment agreements as the more relevant instruments in respect to foreign
investments.
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A. The Concept of Force Majeure and its Elements
The requirements of force majeure are a reflection of the basic principles governing
contractual performance. The choice of adjectives referring to these elements varies from one
legal regime to another. For instance, one legal regime uses the word irresistible while another
would use the word inevitable. It can be argued that regardless of the appellation of the
elements of the concept of force majeure, they reflect an understanding of the principles of
contractual performance. These elements can be categorized in two categories. A conduct
indicating that the party has not assumed the occurrence of the impediment or to perform the
obligation within a paralyzing context. The second one is related to the characteristics of the
impediment rendering the performance impossible.

1. Obligations Assumed by the Parties and the Objective Elements of Force Majeure
A contract or an agreement is an engagement to a specific obligation. Accordingly,
parties are only bound by the obligations to which they agree to be bound to. The obligations
and risks a party engage to perform and assume are to be enforced according to principle of
“pacta sunt servanda”. In contrario, parties should not be held accountable for obligations and
risks they did not assume at the conclusion of the agreement. According to the adage “no one is
bound to do the impossible”, the force majeure concept presumes an assumption that the
parties could not have normally agreed to be bound by a specific obligation if that obligation is
in fact unrealizable.23 Hence, the most important characteristic of force majeure in most legal
regimes is the notion of impossibility. The obligation must be rendered impossible to perform
because of the supervening event. However, the interpretation of the notion of impossibility is
not a subject of consensus among different legal regimes.24 Impossibility can be interpreted
objectively by assessing the characteristics of the event in the abstract, regardless of the
situation of the parties. Accordingly, impossibility exists when it becomes impossible for
anyone to perform the required obligation. Impossibility can also be interpreted subjectively.
Accordingly, impossibility exists when it becomes impossible for the party to execute the
obligation regardless whether could be executed by someone else. An example is Article 275
of the German Civil Code BGB providing that “the obligation is extinct when its performance
is impossible for the debtor or anyone else”.25
Another characteristic of force majeure that seems to rely on the idea of assumed
obligations is the characteristic of un-foreseeability. If a certain event is foreseen at the time of
conclusion of the agreement, it is assumed that the parties have considered it and assumed to
bare the occurrence of the event. In that case, the parties are presumed to have implicitly
agreed either to handle this foreseeable event or to bear the consequences of its occurrence.
However, nuance is necessary if the foreseeable event renders the performance of the
obligation objectively impossible. In such cases, most legal regimes consider the contract void
or null. It seems safe to assume that a degree of un-foreseeability is an inherent constituent of
force majeure even when the law does not explicitly require it. For instance, despite the fact
that the old French law hasn’t explicitly required “un-foreseeability” as an element of force
majeure, the case law has made it a cardinal element of force majeure.26 In contrast, German
law in article 275 BGB does not put an accent on the notion of un-foreseeability. However,
even if the accent is not textually placed on foreseeability, it can be said that a relaxed
requirement of foreseeability is required. Accordingly, subjective foreseeability is considered.
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The circumstances surrounding the contract and the view of the parties indicate whether they
have assumed the occurrence of a certain event.

2.

The Obligation of Good Faith, Normal Conduct and the Subjective Elements of
Force Majeure
The other facade of force majeure are the ideas of good faith and attributability. A
preliminary explanation of the force majeure concept is the absence of a fault attributable to the
debtor. Accordingly, a party should not be held accountable if no fault is attributed. However,
faulty actions can take several forms. It can be in the form of an active conduct of the party
resulting in the occurrence of the event. National laws and commentators use several adjectives
to describe this requirement; it seems that they all indicate the same idea. For instance, some
refer to it as (exteriority), other laws and commentators describe it as an event beyond the
control of the debtor. The difference between the two notions seems to be in the required
degree of control of the party claiming force majeure. Accordingly, an event falling outside the
sphere of the debtor’s control or activity cannot qualify as a force majeure if the requirement is
(exteriority).
For instance, the illness of the debtor or an internal strike would not be considered as
exterior to the debtor. The requirement of (control) seems to attenuate the notion of exteriority
by relying onto a subjective approach (the capacities of the debtor) instead of an abstract
qualification of the event (the event being within the sphere of the debtor).
The conduct attributing the event or its consequences can also take the form of an
omission to do what a normal execution of obligations would require for overcoming the
occurrence of the event or its effects. Therefore, the notion of (control) aside from being used
to situate the event in or out the debtor’s sphere of control also indicates that the event should
be the “do” of the debtor nor a consequence of his actions. So does the word “irresistible”.
Aside from its objective usage to describe the relevant event it also indicates an obligation on
the debtor to take the necessary means to resist the occurrence or to overcome the
consequences of the force majeure. These requirements seem to be a natural implication of a
good faith execution of the contract. If an event arises, which the parties have means to resist
or overcome and yet do not use these means it is assumed that the parties have not acted in
good faith. The required effort however should be assessed according to the relevant force
majeure clause or law as will be examined later.
The conduct’s obligation according to the concept of force majeure does not cease to
exist with the occurrence of the event. The parties are still expected to overcome the
consequences of the event. This expectation is indicated by the terms inevitable, irresistible and
control. The usage of these terms is often not bound by a specific temporal scope; they operate
to cover the supervening event from its occurrence to its consequences.

3.

Objective vs Subjective Approach and the Expansion of Force Majeure
Commentators have tried to find several justifications for the concept of force majeure.
While some have found it in the risk allocation theory and the (res perit debitori) principle. 27
Others see its justification as an interpretation a contrario to the principle of (pacta sunt
servanda).28 Due to this lack of consensus, the definition and elements of force majeure differ
from one legal system to another. Some legal systems like the French and the Egyptian law
require the elements of irresistibility, un-foreseeability and exteriority to be existent all
together.29 Other systems retain only the irresistibility element, while others do not mention unforeseeability at all. However, despite this disparity it seems that all these elements and their
synonyms are constituent of the force majeure concept by virtue of the application of the
principles of assumed obligations, good faith and attribute-ability.
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A party is normally bound by the assumed obligations of the contract. Foreseeable
events susceptible to hampering the execution should normally be in the parties’ mind at the
time of the contract.
Normal good faith behavior requires the parties to prevent the occurrence of these
foreseeable events. It is contrary to the notion of good faith that a party instigates an event
leading to obstruct the execution of the obligation and finally, a party should seek to honor the
obligation despite the occurrence of an event obstructing it. In that sense, the traditional
elements of force majeure overlap in respect their meanings and interpretation.30 The real
difference however resides in the degree of subjectivity or objectivity retained by each system.
In contrast with a traditional or objective approach, a relaxed approach of force majeure tends
to adopt a subjective approach to some of the elements of force majeure or even all the
elements all together.
It seems however that a development towards a more relaxed or subjective approach to
excused inexecution in general is becoming the norm among different legal regimes. For
example, the introduction of the inherently subjective concept of “imprevision”31 in the
traditionally conservative French civil law32 has been celebrated as a development in contract
law.33 The new German contract law adopts a subjective notion of foreseeability as well as a
relative notion of impossibility.34 Accordingly, impossibility is assessed subjectively, but
impossibility can lead to the termination of the contract if the execution of the obligation
becomes unbearable for the debtor. The Norwegian law was traditionally an adept of the strict
lability principle and therefore limiting the scope of force majeure. In 1988 a new sale of goods
act implemented the notion of the event “beyond the control” of the debtor. This trend can also
be found in multiple international instruments like the CICG and the UNIDROIT principles.
This general trend of subjectifying the traditionally objective concept of force majeure blurs
the line separating it from other concepts like hardship and change of circumstances. The
degree of required foreseeability is not necessarily retained by legal systems in a rigid form.
The requirement of exteriority or sphere of control can be attenuated to a subjective
requirement of conduct. Even the cardinal notion of impossibility can move from an absolutist
approach to a relative one aligned with that of hardship or imprevision, only wider in the sense
that it is not limited to economic impossibility or impartibility.
The expansion of the scope of application of force majeure leans towards the protection
of the debtor’s interests. Despite being presented as an application of the principle of “res perit
debitori”35, the force majeure concept is designed to excuse a failing of performance from the
side of the debtor. The wider the scope of the force majeure concept, the more protected the
debtor becomes. In that sense, the contractual balance becomes in favor of the debtor. In
contrast, the narrower this scope becomes, the more protected becomes the “creditor”. In the
context of investments in disputed maritime zones, this research focuses on the situation where
the debtor or the host state fails to execute its obligation (providing permission to work in the
disputed zone). The different approaches of force majeure can influence this equation; it will
be discussed further in the next chapter.
On the other hand, this expansion of the application of the “res perit debitori” principle
in favor of the debtor comes along with more guarantees to the debtor, which helps in
maintaining the balance of the parties’ interests. National laws and commentators are becoming
clearer in differentiating between definitive impossibility and partial or temporal impossibility.
Some commentators proposed to consider “notification of the event of force majeure” as an
element of the concept of force majeure.
30

CLOTILDE JOURDAIN-FORTIER & MARC MIGNOT, ANALYSE COMPAREE DU DROIT FRANÇAIS REFORME DES
CONTRATS ET DES REGLES MATERIELLES DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 308–319 (2016).
31
M. KASSEM, L’ABUS DE DOMINATION EN MATIERE CONTRACTUELLE: ETUDE COMPARATIVE 193–206 (1992).
32

Id. at 181–192.
JOURDAIN-FORTIER AND MIGNOT, supra note 30 at 281–302.
34
SHARIF GHANAM, CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, DUBAI 2010 (IN ARABIC)
35
According to which the debtor should bear the consequences of inexecution.
33

International contracts go even further by elaborating detailed clauses on the process of
negotiating the post-event phase, a process borrowed from the hardship and imprevision
concept.
B.

Force Majeure in International Law
International law constitutes the principal element of the foreign investment’s protection
regime. It provides foreign investors a layer of protection, which has seen its importance,
amplified since the first bilateral investment agreement in 1959. Since then, has developed a
discipline of international economic law, namely the international investment law. The
development of this discipline has found its strength in a huge amount of jurisprudential
arsenal that has not stop growing for several decades. The main sources of International
Investment Law are treaties, costumes and general principles of law.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important instrument of
investors/investment protections.36 They are the main source of international investment treaty
law.37 In contrast to diplomatic protection, these treaties provide investors the possibility to
raise claims against a sovereign host state before international instances without the need of
another sovereign state to elevate its claim to the international plane.38 BITs contain the
essential means of protection of foreign investments; the standards that host states are obliged
to follow when dealing with the investments belonging to nationals of the other contracting
state.

1.

Investment Agreements and the International Customary Law of Force Majeure
As previously, mentioned, international law constitutes a principal layer of protection to
foreign investments. By means of the substantive guarantees, it provides to these investments,
as well as the procedural guarantees taking the form of international tribunal’s competence to
hear the relevant disputes.39 These guarantees can be found in both customary and treaty law,
the latter taking the ascendant over the former with the proliferation of BITs.40
BITs Like all other binding international treaties creating obligations on states are
governed by the Vienna convention on the law of treaties41 and they constitute a source of
international law as stipulated by article 38 of the ICJ statute.42 Therefore, the customary law of
state responsibility as reflected in the ILC daft articles is applicable to BITs and states are
responsible for the breach of their provisions. And as the draft articles stipulate the regulation
of state responsibility, they also demonstrate the circumstances precluding wrongfulness
namely; force majeure, necessity, distress, consent, counter measures and self-defense.
Article 23 of the ILC Draft Articles addressing force majeure shows that the elements of
“force majeure” in international law are not different from those known in national laws.43
Force majeure in international law is an unpredictable or irresistible event that is exterior to the
will or control of the state and that makes it impossible for the state to perform its international
obligation. That definition shows that the requirements for an event to be qualified as a force
majeure are generally the same as those required in national systems.
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It is worth noticing that Article 27 of the draft articles has left the door opened to
compensation of the material damages that might occur because of state actions under force
majeure.44 International law seems to adopt the principle of res perit debitori in the sense that the
risks are allocated to the debtor of the obligation who would not be able to request the other party to
fulfill his counter obligation. However, the draft articles seem to avoid the critique made to the risk
allocation as applied by force majeure in domestic law where the creditor is not entitled to
compensation for damages in the case of non-performance for force majeure. International law in
this sense is more balanced in term of risk allocation by permitting the allocation of the risk to both
parties.
In order to examine how “force majeure” operates in the realm of BITs, it is important first to
look into the relation between BITs and international customary law as the main source of the
“force majeure” defense.45 Most commentators agree that International Investment Law is not a
self-contained regime,46 in fact, BITs are the product of international law and they remain governed
by international law as an international treaty.47 Unless contained by a lex-specialis, customary
international law remains the law of the treaty upon which the interpretation and the application of
the treaty relies.48 It is also relied upon to fill the vacuum that left by the provision of a given
treaty.49The most relevant example is the rules of state responsibility governing the obligations by
which the states party to a treaty are bound and the consequences of breaches to these obligations as
well the circumstances precluding wrongfulness.
2. Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Agreements
Some BITs contain what are known as “non-precluded measures” clauses or NPM
clauses. Generally, the NPM clause is the mechanism by which a State party to a BIT can rely on
to take measures that would be otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the BIT.50Despite
that, the number of BITs containing such clause are relatively small, they are still important
enough to be considered.51 Especially that this type of clauses has attracted the interest of
commentators, being a major component of the cardinal cases known as “the Argentinian gas
cases”.52 In our examination of this clause the focus on the Argentine – USA BIT clause will be
as a model clause, on one hand because of the interest it has attracted during and after the
Argentinian cases, and on the other hand because of its wide scope and the vagueness of its
wording are prone to conflictual interpretation as shown by the Argentinian experience.
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The most interesting feature of the “Argentinian gas cases” is that they all rely on the same factual
grounds, the same Argentina – USA BIT, the claimants have made more or less very close claims in
respect of the alleged violation of the BIT and finally, Argentina relied of the same defense in all
the cases, namely the necessity defense under article XI of the Argentina – USA bilateral
investment agreement and customary law. Therefore, it was a rare occasion where it could be
observed how several arbitral bodies would work on practically the same case and interpret NPM
clauses simultaneously.53

a. Examples of Non-Precluded Measures Clauses
The wording of the NPM clause differs from one BIT to another.54 For instance, the
Germany – China BIT stipulates that “ Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public
security and order, public health or morality shall not be deemed ‘treatment less favorable’
within the meaning of Article 3” [article 3 contains the most favored nation standard of treatment
].55
The Belgium / Luxemburg economic (BLEU) union and Montenegro treaty includes an
NPM clause in article 3 stating as following “Except for measures required to maintain public
order, such investments shall enjoy continuous protection and security, i.e. excluding any
unjustified or discriminatory measure which could hinder, either in law or in practice, the
management, maintenance, use, possession or liquidation thereof”56.
A similar clause is also found in article 11 of the India – UK BIT stipulating the following
“(I) Subject to the provisions ·of this Agreement, all investment shall be governed by the laws in
force in the territory of the Contracting Party in which such investments are made. (2)
Notwithstanding paragraph (I) of this Article nothing in this Agreement precludes the host
Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or in
circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its laws normally and reasonably
applied on a non-discriminatory basis.”57
Comparing the above-mentioned clauses with the USA – Argentina BIT, some
commentators have noted the difference between them in respect to the required circumstances
triggering this clause.58 It seems that the most important difference resides in the scope of each
clause.59 The German and the Belgium BITs limit the scope of their respective NPM clauses to
attenuate only specific provisions of the BIT (BLEU limiting the scope of “protection and
security” clause and the German limiting the scope of the “less favorable nation” clause).60
Therefore, there is very little ground for arguing that a circumstance mentioned in these NPM
lead to the suspension of the whole BIT.
Article XI of the USA – Argentina BIT provides that “This Treaty shall not preclude the
application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the
fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace
or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests”.
The article contemplated the cases where it would be triggered. These cases are the
maintenance of public order, fulfilling the state’s obligations in respect to the maintenance of
international peace and security and finally, the preservation of its essential national interests.
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The wording of article XI is general and wide enough to sustain a claim that it is establishing a
general rule or regime the preclusion of wrongfulness.
There is however, no consensus on whether this article constitutes a “lex-specialis” or
whether it is a mere reflection of costmary international law as reflected in the ILC draft articles
on state responsibility.

b. Non-Precluded Measures and International Customary Law
The tribunals in Sempra, CMS, Enron and LG&E have all agreed that Argentina’s
measures in response of its economic crisis constituted a violation of the provisions of the USA
– Argentina BIT. The issue is to determine if Argentina is liable for these violations or if they
were excused according to customary law on necessity or the NPM clause. CMS considered the
NPM clause as a reflection of customary law and therefore, it referred to the element of necessity
in customary law to assess the Argentinian defense.61
Enron and Sempra refused to consider article XI “lex-specialis”. In the view of both
tribunals, the lack of specific requirements to invoke the state of necessity and the article’s only
stipulating cases or circumstances to preclude wrongfulness in respect of the BIT means that it is
necessary to look for these requirements in customary law.62
LG&E tribunal’s accepted Argentina’s claim and considered article XI to be a “lexspecialis”, accordingly the tribunal found that the Argentinian measures were within the scope of
this article and decided that Argentina didn’t commit any breach to the BIT.

c. Non-Precluded Measures, a Grandfather Clause of Force Majeure
Most commentators address the NPM clause in accordance with the defense of “necessity”
whether based on customary law or a treaty provision.63 It seems the NPM clause has been
taken hostage of the Argentinian cases and the Argentinian defense of necessity. This situation
led most commentators who have approached this subject to examine it as a necessity clause or
at least a clause to be studied within the necessity conditions and requirements. This tendency
might be due the fact that the tribunals of the Argentinian cases have discussed article XI of the
BIT through its relation to customary law on necessity without looking at it as a wider rule on
state responsibility and preclusion and wrongfulness.64 It is also possible that the impression of
an organic relation between the NPM clause in a BIT and the “necessity defense” in customary
law is the usage of the word (necessary measures) to stipulate the article.65 That is despite the
fact that the normal meaning of the word (necessary) is not necessarily the equivalent of
“necessity” as a legal concept, which has a narrower, meaning due to the conditions required to
be acknowledged as such.
There is no claim that widening the perspective of looking to NPM clauses would have
necessarily changed the outcome of any of the Argentinian cases which is not going to be a
subject of an in-depth examination here, being deeply examined elsewhere.66
61
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However, that a wider understanding of NPM clause would have been of more
contribution to the understanding of state responsibility in the realm of investment agreements.
It is now clear how different tribunals and commentators differ in their analysis of the
nature of the NPM clause. That each opinion relies on plausible arguments. To consider the
NPM clause as a mere reflection of customary law discharges the interpretation process from the
principle of effectivity as a rule of interpretation.67 Interpretation must give meaning and effect
to all terms of a treaty; an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing
whole clauses or paragraphs to redundancy or inutility.68 It seems inadequate to consider a
clause stipulated by the parties of an agreement as void of a given meaning they both meant, that
is unless they have both made this presumed reference clear.69 Otherwise, it is imperative to
determine the meaning wanted by the parties without widening the interpretation or narrowing it
to the extent of disregarding the intent of the state’s parties when the agreement was made.
On the other hand, to consider the NPM clause as a contained system that is independent
and self-reliant is a broad interpretation that is sustained neither by the purposes of the BIT, nor
by the explicit stipulation of the clause. A BIT (and there is nothing to sustain that Argentina US
is an exception) means to protect the investments of both parties made in the other party’s
territory, broadening the scope of the NPM clause leads to limit the scope of application of the
BIT to normal and regular times, while removing un-regular circumstances and times out of the
scope of application of the BIT. This seems a radical interpretation that goes against to the
purpose of A BIT which is normally to provide foreign investments a layer of protection that is
independent of the national legal and political regime and that ensures a certain stability and
certainty to foreign investments. Furthermore, nothing prevents states from explicitly limiting
the scope of application of their BIT to regular times, which is in fact a policy followed by a
number of states in respect to their BITs.
Nevertheless, this is not a reason to disregard the article or to reduce it to redundancy.
Article XI of the Argentinian – USA BIT denominates the circumstances that trigger the clause;
however, it does not define any of these circumstances and their features, nor the conditions of
the measures that states are entitled to take upon the existence of these circumstances. Giving
this vacuum, I do not think that considering article XI as a “lex specialis” necessarily lead to a
negation to the role of customary law as the general law of interpretation.
The ILC Draft Articles have determined the required elements of force majeure. They also
require “impossibility” as the main effect. However, it is hard to claim that exists a uniform
conception of the notion of impossibly as a general principle of law. Some national laws have
adopted a narrow definition of force majeure while other have expanded it. Generally,
impossibility means (the absolute impossibility of performance) not merely to be extremely
difficult or onerous. Article XI seems to establish a lower threshold in respect of the meaning of
impossibility in the realm of the USA - Argentina BIT.
The circumstances mentioned by the article (international peace and security for example)
are all of such a nature where it is hard to determine if it is possible for a state to overcome them
or even to determine the proper means of overcoming them. For instance, it is obvious how the
tribunals in the Argentinian cases have agreed that Argentina was facing a major economic crisis
and that the crisis was not imputable to Argentina. Even the tribunals that dismissed Argentina’s
defense of necessity considered the crisis when assessing compensation. Nevertheless, they have
differed as to whether the measures taken by Argentina were “the” necessary measures to face its
crisis. Taking article XI into consideration in respect to “force majeure”, the article stipulates a
list of events or circumstances forming a threshold to instigate a non-compliance system that the
treaty omitted to mention.
67
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The non-compliance system known in customary law is the “circumstances precluding
wrongfulness” as reflected in the ILC draft articles. One of these circumstances is “force
majeure”. The ILC articles set the elements and requirements of force majeure but they do not
prevent states from modifying these requirements in their own agreements. One of the common
ways to modify or to relax the elements of “force majeure” clauses is to include an exhaustive or
non-exhaustive list of events upon which an interpreter can rely to deduce the notion of force
majeure as intended by the parties. This private law approach seems to be the approach by which
Sempra and Enron tribunal tackled this issue. By doing so, these tribunals opened a space for
arguing that NPM clauses can have the same function of “lists of events” in international
contracts as will be seen in the following section.

C. Force Majeure in International Contracts
“Force Majeure” clauses are a recurrent feature in most international contracts and
investment agreements.70 Given that, the investment relationship is going to be long and
potentially with many legal and political changes. Even in civil law countries where “force
majeure” is already defined by law, the parties to an investment contract tend to design their
own force majeure clause adapted to their needs.71 This practice is sustained by the fact that the
“force majeure” concept is not of public order in most legal systems, therefore parties are free
to design their own “force majeure” regime.72 In common, law countries where the doctrine of
“force majeure” does not exist, it becomes primordial for the parties to insert it in their
contract.
The “force majeure” clause function is to anticipate the occurrence of an event of force
majeure during the execution of the contract. Generally, this clause contains the definition73 of
“force majeure” or the hypothesis upon which it rests,74 the effects of the occurrence of an
event of force majeure to be considered as such, and it can also contain the modalities of it’s a
activation .75 Sometimes, the “force majeure” clause defines its scope of application by
precluding certain obligation from being covered by such defense76 or even by eliminating the
executory effect of force majeure in certain cases.77
The ideal drafted force majeure clause must contain the definition, effects and modalities
of “force majeure” as conceived by the parties to be able to be fully effective.78 However, some
clauses define force majeure only by inserting an illustrating list of events.79
For example, the “force majeure” clause in this “Philippine / shell” contract stipulates
the following: “a) Any failure or delay …… shall be excused to the extent attributable to force
majeure b) (provides the modalities of extension of the contract in case of force majeure) c)
force majeure shall include act of God, unavoidable accidents, acts of war or conditions arising
out of or attributed to war declared or undeclared, laws, rules, regulations and orders … “80
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The illustrative list should serve as guidance to deduce (or in other cases to sustain an
already defined notion of force majeure) the characteristics of “force majeure” as meant by the
parties. For instance, a list containing events of an “act of god” might indicate that the parties
refer to a traditional notion of force majeure. Nevertheless, this technique seems to be defective
as it often complicated to deduce the elements of force majeure from such lists. Most
importantly, the events stipulated in an exhaustive list cannot qualify as “force majeure” unless
they have the characteristics of force majeure.81 For instance, if a list contains “war” as an
example of a force majeure, a party cannot claim “force majeure” when a war happens if it
does not affect the performance of the obligation.

1. Defining Force Majeure Clauses by Reference
Some clauses define force majeure with reference to a certain legal regime. It can be the
national law of the contract or another legal instrument.82 Some clauses do not contain an
illustrative list nor a definition of force majeure and the elements upon which force majeure
should be assessed.83 In this case, the clause settles with mentioning the applicable regime and
effects if a force majeure occurs.84 For instance, the “force majeure” clause in the contract made
between Cameroon’s Société Nationale des hydrocarbure / Perenco oil / Kosmos energy
provides the following “ For the purposes of this Agreement, Force Majeure means any act of
God, perils of navigation, storm, flood, earthquake, lightning, explosion, fire, hostilities, war
(declared or undeclared), blockade, insurrection, civil commotion, acts of public enemy,
quarantine restriction, epidemics, accident, riot, strike or labor disturbance, any act or failure to
act of a Governmental agency or local body (provided such act or failure to act is the proximate
cause of non-performance or delay in performance of any obligation under this Agreement or the
exercise of any right dependent thereon) or any other cause beyond the control of any affected
Party.”85
In this clause, the parties rely on an illustrative list to refer to “force majeure”. In such
cases, it seems reasonable to assume that the national law or the applicable law of the contract on
the characteristics of force majeure would apply.86

2. Clauses Defining Force Majeure with an Abstract Definition
Generally, clauses in long-term contracts define force majeure in a traditional way by
stipulating the three usual element or characteristics of force majeure being irresistibly,
unpredictability and exteriority. Such clause can be found in the Cypriot model of “production
sharing agreement” stipulating that “For purposes of this Contract, cases of Force Majeure are
considered to include all events which are unforeseeable, irresistible and beyond the control of
the Party which invokes it, such as earthquake, riot, insurrection, civil disturbances, acts of war
or acts attributable to war. The intent of the Parties is that the term Force Majeure shall be
interpreted in accordance with the principles and practice of international law.”87
Most clauses contain a definition of force majeure as well as an illustrative list of events.88
In such cases, the illustrative list might help to sustain the already defined notion of force
majeure. When parties define the notion of “force majeure”, they are free to emphasize a given
element while relaxing another.
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3. Clause Reconfiguring the Requirements of Force Majeure
In some cases, parties use clauses that broaden or tighten the definition of force majeure
according to the specificities and characteristics of their investment.89 Some contracts contain
clauses that relax the traditionally required elements of force majeure or emphasize one of these
elements. Such clauses help parties to adapt the force majeure clause to the nature of their
economic activity as well as the geopolitics of a given host state.

a. Un-Foreseeability
In the case of a long-term investment in a geopolitically hazardous location, parties might
feel the need to relax the notion of un-foreseeability. It is clear that un-foreseeability despite
being a traditional element of force majeure is subject to legislative and jurisprudence traction on
the national level. The practice of attenuating “un-foreseeability” is therefore not foreign to legal
drafting in general. In the following clause from this contract between Ghana’s GNPC / ENI and
others, the parties omitted to expressly require un-foreseeability "Force Majeure" means any
event beyond the reasonable control of the Party claiming to be affected by such event which has
not been brought about directly or indirectly at its own instance or which has not been brought
about directly or indirectly at the instance of an Affiliate. Force Majeure events may include, but
are not limited to, acts of God, accidents, fires, explosions, earthquake, storm, flood, hurricanes,
tidal waves, cyclones, tornados, lightning or other adverse weather conditions or any other
natural disasters, war, acts of war, acts of terrorism, embargo, blockade, riot, civil disorder, or
strike”.90 In other clauses parties could require that to qualify as a force majeure, an event must
not be “reasonably foreseeable”91

b. Irresistibility and Sphere of Control
The relaxation or relativization can also extend to the unavoidability or the irresistibility
of an event.92 The party must not have passively contributed to its occurrence by not taking
adequate measures to prevent it or to surmount its effects.93 The event qualifying as a force
majeure must not be attributed to the party that is claiming it. The party must not have actively
contributed by its conduct to the occurrence of the event. This requirement is also referred to as
the exteriority element.
The force majeure clause indicates whether the obligation to prevent the force majeure is
an absolute or relative obligation. Whether any measure exists to surmount the effects, or the
occurrence of a given event and whether the party is capable of taking these measure (or making
the proper effort) are two separate questions.
The usage of phrases such as “reasonably” or “beyond reasonable control” indicates that
the parties mean to relax the notion of unavoidability.94
This clause for example provides that “Force Majeure” means an event, other than the
obligation to pay money (unless payment is prohibited by government instruction or order as
noted below), which could not reasonably be expected to have been prevented or controlled and
is beyond the ability of the affected Party to control using reasonable efforts…”95 Another
example can be found in this clause from a contract between Guyana and CGX resources
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stipulating that “ In this Article, the term "force majeure" shall mean any event beyond the
reasonable control of the Party claiming to be affected by such event…”96
A similar clause can also be found in the contract between Grenada and RSM stating
“force majeure” means any event beyond the reasonable control of the party claiming to be
affected by such event which has not been brought about at its instance and which has caused
such non-performance or delay in performance”97

c. Impossibility and the Effects of an Event of Force Majeure
National laws are not uniform in their conception of the “impossibility” of performance.
Some legal systems opt for a narrow interpretation of impossibility requiring it to be absolute,
while other systems opt for a wider concept that only requires impossibility to be relative.
Similarly, contract clauses can strengthen and relax the element of impossibility according to
each contract necessity. For instance, the following clause indicates the relaxation of the element
of impossibility, “If either party is prevented from or delayed in carrying out any of the
provisions of this Agreement by reason of ... [enumeration of events] " ... or any cause beyond
its control making it impossible or exorbitant from an industrial or commercial standpoint to
perform its obligations hereunder .... “98
This clause has explicitly relaxed the required threshold for an event to qualify as
rendering performance impossible. Some commentators note that such clauses remove the
difference between “force majeure” and “hardship”. These clauses coincide with the practice of
some national laws aiming to relax the concept of force majeure. However, the event must be
near to crippling the party’s capability to perform their obligations.
The traditional effect of force majeure is to liberate the party from the obligation
becoming impossible to perform and exonerating the party from responsibility of nonperformance. Parties who are keen on the survival of the investment contract (which is often the
case in long-term investment agreements) include a suspensive effect to the force majeure
clause.99 Accordingly, the obligation is only “temporarily” suspended as long as the force
majeure event is temporary or surmountable.100 That entails an obligation of due diligence or
best effort onto the parties to surmount the event of force majeure and its effect. In the latter case
however, the parties must have adopted a rather relaxed definition of the element of
impossibility being in that case a surmountable event despite its rigorousness.

4.

Common Features of Force Majeure Clauses in Long Term Investment Contracts
The first observation to be made in respect to international maritime investment
contracts is the fact that “force majeure” clauses seem to constitute an important and common
element in practically all these contracts. The “force majeure” regime is always mentioned in
the contract whether it is by reference to a given legal system or by a special design stipulated
by the contract. Most of the contracts studied for the purpose of this research seem to abandon
the requirement of “un-foreseeability” as an element of “force majeure” as well as adopting a
relaxed notion of irresistibility and impossibility of performance101 .
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Very few contracts retain the element of un-foreseeability either by explicitly requiring
it102 or by referring to a national law adopting un-foreseeability as a required element of force
majeure.103 The reason behind the adoption of a relaxed notion of “force majeure” might
resides in two element. First, the longevity of the investments, which makes it, complicated to
foresee events that might happen in years or maybe decades. Second is the fact that most of the
studied contracts are performed in either maritime areas that are disputed or are related to a
disputed area. The different implications of such clauses in the case of a maritime dispute will
be further addressed in the following parts.

II. MARITIME DISPUTES AS EVENT OF FORCE
SUPERVENIENCE OF A ZONAL CONTESTATION

MAJEURE:

THE

The previous part has demonstrated that the concept of force majeure is a flexible concept
that can be interpreted rigidly or flexibly according to the relevant legal regime. The elements of
this concept are designed differently, according to the context into which they are supposed to
operate. Each interpretation of each element of the force majeure concept can affect the party’s
obligations and required conduct within the specific context of their investment agreement or
contract. This part will apply the different interpretations of the elements of force majeure on the
elements of maritime zonal disputes. It will demonstrate that different constructions of the elements
of foreseeability, irresistibility and the notion of impossibility can change the outcome when
defining whether a maritime zonal dispute qualifies as a force majeure event.
Coastal states in dispute are both entitled to explore and exploit the disputed area. It is legally
presumed that both states may claim the relevant rights over the contested zone.104 However, this
right is conditioned by procedural105 and substantive conditions.
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Paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS reads as follows: “Pending
[delimitation]... the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement”.106 The text do not prevent
the exploitation or exploration of a disputed area, on the contrary, it creates a framework of
procedural and substantive elements to organize the economic activity of the states in dispute. States
claiming a given maritime zone are both entitled to explore and exploit it. They just become under
an obligation of restrain while practicing their right. The restraint obligation is reflected in articles
74(3) and 83(3) of the convention, which impose an obligation of conduct on both states as well as a
limitation of the permissible activities.
A dispute over a maritime zone in the sense of the law of sea is an event created by a state’s
“contestation” of another state’s claim that imposes an “obligation of conduct” on claiming states
and renders “illegal” or impermissible the performance of some kinds of economic activities. In the
language of the concept of force majeure, a maritime dispute can be a “supervening” event
rendering the parties’ obligations in the realm of an investment agreement “illegal / impossible” by
activating the provisions of articles 74(3) and 83(3). This event in order to create the possible
“illegality” provided by these provisions must satisfy three elements. First, a contestation must
occur. Second, contesting states must fail to abide by the obligation of conduct provided by articles
74 and 83. Third the economic activity must be of a nature which jeopardizes the reach of a final
agreement and therefore un-permissible.
In order to determine whether a maritime dispute is a “force majeure” these elements must be
deconstructed and analyzed separately to determine if they satisfy the required elements of “force
majeure” (unpredictability, irresistibility) and it has the effect required to qualify an even as a force
majeure, which is rendering performance “illegal / un-permissible”.

A. The Regime Governing the Economic Exploitation of Undisputed and Disputed
Maritime Zones
This section begins with a discussion of the regime governing the economic exploitation
of maritime zones to identify the inherent sovereign rights of costal states upon their maritime
zones.

1. The Economic Exploitation of Undisputed Maritime Zones
Coastal states are entitled to an exclusive economic zone that extend to 200 nautical miles
from their baseline.107 Sovereign rights over a maritime zone differs from sovereignty over land.
The latter requires physical presence and effective control over land, the former is merely
dependent on a claim of the concerned coastal state.108 In this sense, a state’s rights upon its EEZ
is merely a legal assertation rather than a factual reality. UNCLOS has given coastal states the
exclusive right to explore and exploit their exclusive economic zones. These rights are an
inherent constituent of the right to an exclusive economic zone. The powers of coastal states
however may not exceed the necessities of exercising these rights.109
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The cornerstone of the economic legal regime of exclusive economic zones is article 56 of
the UNCLOS III which provides the following:
“1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has: (a) Sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether
living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds”
The examples provided by this article are not exhaustive. State’s sovereign rights extend
to all kinds of economic activities using the resources of the EEZ. As some commentators have
noted, the drafters of UNCLOS could not anticipate at the time of the elaboration of the text all
the possible ways of exploiting the maritime resources.110 Therefore, the language of the treaty
came general to encompass future activities that would fall within the scope of “economic
exploitation”.
In order to exercise their sovereign rights upon their EEZ, States are entitled to construct
installations and structures for economic purposes.111 UNCLOS has also granted coastal states
the right to build artificial islands and other installations that interfere with the exercise of their
accorded rights. Coastal states are also entitled to jurisdiction on these structures and
installations.
Third states continue to enjoy the right of freedom to use and navigate the exclusive
economic zones of the coastal state through all means that are lawful and do not prevent the
coastal state of exercising its sovereign rights. The UNCLOS balances between the need to
exploit the natural resources of waters beyond territorial waters and the established rights of all
nations such as the free navigation in oceans.112 It is not random that the convention tries to
regulate state’s sovereign rights on their exclusive economic zones in a manner that do not
prevent third states from enjoying their rights of free navigation, overflight and the laying of
submarine cables.
The UNCLOS requires costal states not to interfere with these rights while exercising their
exclusive rights within their EEZ. For instance, coastal states are required to notify of any
installation of structure to be built the requirement as well to maintain and the removal of
abandoned structures.
On the other hand, costal states are entitled to maintain a reasonable safety zone around
installations and islands that all ships must respect. The only aspect of freedom of navigation
that prevails over costal states sovereign rights is non-interference with recognized sea-lanes
essential to international navigation.113

2. The Economic Exploitation of Disputed Maritime Zones
In some cases, coastal states entitlement to an exclusive economic zone interferes with the
same right of another state. For example, when the distance between the shores of two costal
states is less than 400 nautical miles. In that case, until a delimitation occurs, if the relevant
states make overlapping claims over a certain area, a legal presumption exists that both states are
entitled and may claim the relevant sovereign rights upon the same disputed zone made in bona
fida.
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) are the main instrument of UNCLOS regulating the economic
exploitation and exploration of exclusive economic zones and continental shelves where
overlapping claims interact. The adopted regime is a merge of two different approaches
regarding the exploitation of contested maritime zones that competed during the discussions
preceding UNCLOS III.
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Some states proposed a suspension of economic activities in disputed areas and others
proposed the requirement of provisional arrangement pending final agreement.114 The
convention took elements from both approaches. On one hand, the prevention of some activities
susceptible of hampering the final decision. On the other hand, the requirement that states should
seek provisional arrangements.115 Two interests ought to be protected in this schema. On the one
hand, permitting the economic exploitation of the disputed area and on the other preserving the
residual rights of the state to which the disputed zones are granted after the delimitation. Articles
74 and 83 are to provide a balance between these two interests. In sum, it can be said that a
dispute over a given maritime zone creates procedural and substantive limitations on the
economic activity while expanding the concept of exclusivity to encompass both claiming states.

B. Maritime Zonal Contestation as a Force Majeure Event
The following section will examine the procedural and substantive requirements
governing the economic exploitation of disputed maritime zones in more depth. The examination
of those requirements will be dealt with from the perspective of the elements of “force majeure”.

1. Foreseeability
The foreseeability of a maritime contestation is the primary element to be determined in
order to establish whether the contestation satisfies the requirements of force majeure. As
mentioned previously, the element of foreseeability extends to both the occurrence of the event
as well as to its consequences. In the context of maritime zonal disputes, both the contestation
and the consequent illegality or un-permissibility arising from this contestation must be
unpredictable. Maritime zonal disputes arise initially from a lack of delimitation that supersedes
the overlap of claims. However, the overlap of claims is not a fatal consequence of the lack of
delimitation. It is therefore not necessary to predict an overlap of claims upon the mere lack of
delimitation. Moreover, the lack of delimitation is not as such a decisive element in the
prediction of a subsequent illegality or un-permissibility of a certain economic activity. Finally,
the rules and factors governing delimitation in international law must be taken into consideration
to assess if a contestation is predictable or not.

a. The Difference between Undelimited Zones and Disputed Zones
Each coastal state is entitled to an exclusive economic zone up to 200 nm. States define
their maritime spaces by unilaterally establishing the limits of their maritime zones.116 However,
if these spaces are in contact with the space of another state, the sovereign rights of these states
are considered overlapping. The resolution of this contact requires a delimitation between the
concerned states. Hence, the difference between limitation and delimitation resides in the first
being a national act and the second being an international act whether in form of agreement of a
judicial decision.117
The lack of delimitation is not the corollary of a zonal dispute. The maritime zonal dispute
being an overlap of claims over a defined area arises only when both states make their claims
resulting in the contestation of each other’s claimed zone. The wording of articles 74 and 83
“pending agreement” creates uncertainty as to whether the obligations required by the articles
are triggered by the mere lack of delimitation or by an overlap of claims.118 The latter
interpretation seems more adequate for practical considerations. There is no reason to assume an
obligation of restraint on behalf of a coastal state whose maritime claim is not challenged by
another state.
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It is also not conceivable that a state’s economic activity in a claimed maritime zone that
is uncontested hampers or jeopardizes reaching a final agreement that would not eventually
encompass the relevant zone. The tribunal’s reasoning in both Ghana vs Cote d’ivoire and
Suriname vs Guyana indicates that the tribunals adopted the criteria of “overlapping claims” to
deduce the scope of the dispute. In the first case, the tribunal begins the assessment of the
legality of Ghana’s conduct by determining Ghana’s knowledge of the existence of a dispute.
The lack of delimitation was not enough to determine such knowledge; in fact, the tribunal relied
on previous correspondence between the two states indicating that specific areas were being
disputed between the parties.119
Accordingly, the maritime zones falling outside the geographical scope of the claim of the
other state cannot be considered disputed despite the lack of an official delimitation. 120
Unilateral activity in an un-delimited area falling outside the geographical scope of another
state’s contestation is not governed by the obligations provided by articles 74 and 83.121

b. The Geographical Scope of a Potential Contestation in Case of Lack of Delimitation
The lack of a delimitation between two or more maritime zones in contact is susceptible to
the creation of overlapping claims. The unsurmountable geography that makes it impossible for
a state to claim a 200 nm area imposes on states the duty to make their claims upon different
criteria and in good faith. The question is to determine the criteria upon which a state might
formulate its claim in the absence of the applicability of the 200 NM rule. To answer this
question, it is necessary to observe the law of maritime delimitation of overlapping maritime
zones as reflected in jurisprudence and state practice, to determine what the scope of a state’s
claim and the potential area that might be disputed might be.

c. The Prevalence of the Equidistance Approach and Other Factors of Delimitation
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) Of the UNCLOS provides “The delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone/continental shelf with the opposite or adjacent coasts shell be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”122
However, the convention does not provide a specific method for determining how a
delimitation is made.123 The methodology of maritime delimitation grew out of jurisprudence
that began with the North Sea Continental Shelf case.124 It is safe to affirm that established a
corrective – equity approach to maritime delimitation has now been established.125 This
approach consists of a delimitation based upon three stages. The First stage is the establishment
of a median line or an equidistant line between the base points of each state. The Second stage is
a shift of this median line if relevant (geographical and non-geographical) circumstances justify
it. The most important factors that are commonly retained by international tribunals are the
configuration of the coasts and the coasts length. The third stage is a general test of equity,
which is applied to determine whether the result of the first two stages is equitable.
Ghana vs cote d’ivoire para. 586
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This method, despite giving tribunals a margin of appreciation that is based upon
predictable factors like the geographical factors has the advantage of retaining a degree of
predictability by incorporating the equidistance approach.126

d. The Predictability of a Zonal Contestation
Looking at it from an absolutist approach, a force majeure event is always predictable. To
predict an event is to foresee the future according to an analysis of what is naturally, sociopolitically and legally possible. Accordingly, only events that seem at the moment of making the
contract impossible to happen can be qualified as force majeure. Therefore, a strike or a typhoon
being a natural event, which occurs in nature in the abstract, cannot qualify as a force majeure.
Following this logic, a contestation of a maritime area belonging to a state who has not delimited
its maritime areas is always possible and therefore cannot be an unforeseeable event. However,
as a commentator has noted, the law cannot ask someone to be a superhuman who can predict
what is unpredictable.127 Therefore, national laws do not adopt such an extreme interpretation of
the element of foreseeability. All national laws tend to relax the notion of un-foreseeability to
one degree or another. Likewise, contractual clauses adopting a force majeure regime are
inclined not to tighten the degree of required foreseeability.128
Most national laws adopt a relative approach to the concept of force majeure and the
element of foreseeability. This approach is followed by most long-term investment contracts
seeking to establish a balance between the stability of the contract and the possibilities of the
future. The expression of “reasonably foreseeable” seems to be a common instrument to indicate
this approach. According to this approach, considering the lack of delimitation to be a reason to
foresee a zonal contestation seems to be a higher threshold than indicated by the clause. This is
still not a reason to completely eliminate the lack of contestation as an element of appreciation.
A contestation arising while investing in a non-delimited zone is always a possibility.
However, the probable scope of the contestation should be a key element to determine whether it
could have been reasonably expected. For instance, giving the prevalence of the equidistance
method of delimitation, it is reasonable to assume that an opposite or adjacent state would
possibly make a claim that corresponds approximatively to the equidistant line. Furthermore, an
extreme concavity, convexity, or disproportionality of the relevant coasts should indicate that a
claim from the other state that is shifting accordingly would not be an unreasonable claim.
Therefore, one can assume that the closer the investment is to the equidistant line, the greater the
foreseeability of a contestation encompassing the area of the investment.
Some notions of force majeure do not retain the foreseeability element. That approach is
followed by some contracts.129 The lack of un-foreseeability is not corollary with the event being
already in place at the moment of the contract. For instance, if two parties agree invest in an
already disputed zone; they cannot claim the dispute to be a force majeure at a later stage. (They
can however claim the hazards arising from this dispute as will be addressed later). In such case,
the parties are assumed aware of the already existing circumstance and assuming the relevant
risks.
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However, not requiring foreseeability indicates that the parties have adopted a very low
threshold in respect to foreseeing the future. Arguably, under a relaxed approach of unforeseeability, the fact that a maritime area is not delimited or that it is disputed does not suffice
as such as an event of force majeure. For instance, In RSM vs Grenada, the investment
agreement between the parties has been concluded and the dispute between Grenada and its
neighbors was already known. Applying a foreseeability test using a relative or absolutist
approach would have resulted in considering the event as foreseeable. However, in this case, the
parties and the tribunal agreed that the event was tantamount to a force majeure. The force
majeure clause did not retain foreseeability as an element of force majeure. Despite that, the
tribunal did not elaborate on the force majeure question, it seems that the Grenadian maritime
dispute would have satisfied the element of force majeure as required by the contract.

2. “Irresistibility and Control” in Light of the Obligation to Seek an Arrangement
States in dispute shall make every effort to enter into a provisional agreement regarding
economic exploitation. The procedural obligation mentioned here is not to actually enter into a
joint agreement but rather to seek a practical arrangement.130 The Guyana/Suriname tribunal
defined the content of this obligation as a “conciliatory approach to negotiations”.131
Accordingly, this obligation would be breached if one state insists on making no concession to
reach an agreement. However, the obligation remains to seek an agreement in good faith and to
make every possible effort to achieve that. The tribunal listed examples for what would be
considered as acts of good faith in the relevant context such as “offering to share the result of the
exploration…”.
This obligation provided in articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS is an obligation of conduct.
States involved in a zonal dispute are encouraged to adopt an approach of understanding and
make a credible effort to reach a mutual understanding upon their different interests. Otherwise,
the conduct of the state would qualify as illegal.
In this sense, the provisions of articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS are coinciding with the
requirement of “resisting the occurrence of the force majeure” to satisfy the element of
irresistibility. Articles 74 and 83 are a special legal regime that constitutes a derogation from the
normal regime governing the exploitation of Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental Shelves
to an exceptional one aiming to coordinate the rights of the contesting states. Consequently,
acting outside the realm of this regime by breaching its provisions makes the exploitation illegal.
In order to resist making the exploitation illegal, states are meant to make the effort provided by
articles 74 and 83.
The tribunal in Guyana vs Suriname considered that Suriname refusal to send a delegation
to negotiate a practical arrangement with Guyana tantamount to a breach of the obligation in to
seek the reach of an agreement.132 It also sets examples for conduct that qualifies as a breach of
the obligation to “seek an arrangement” such as not informing the other state about its activities
in the contested area.133 The latter argument was brought by Cote Ivoire against Ghana as
evidence for the latter being in breach of the obligation to seek arrangement.134 The tribunal’s
reasoning is an example for how a host state might fail to fulfill its obligations in a maritime
disputed zone, which may lead to render the exploitation unpermissible. In that case, the host
state might also be found to have failed to fulfill its obligation to resist or avoid the occurrence
of the force majeure.
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3. “Impossibility” and Permissible Activities in Disputed Maritime Zones
The consequence of an event claimed to be a force majeure must be to render the
execution of the relevant obligation impossible. In the realm of maritime contestations, the zonal
dispute renders some activities un-permissible if performed unilateral by one of the contesting
states.

a. The Obligation not to Hamper the Reach of a Final Agreement
The substantive obligation regarding the permitted economic activity in disputed areas
rests on the requirement not to hamper or jeopardize the reaching of a final agreement. The ICJ
in the Aegean Sea case explained the nature of this obligation as “the requirement not to cause
irreparable damage”.135 For instance, the exhaustion or the appropriation of the resources of the
disputed area or the deformation of the natural environment can be qualified as an activity that
causes irreparable damages.136 These sorts of activities are susceptible of depriving the state to
which the disputed area would be later gained from exercising its sovereign rights upon it. It is
not irrational in that case to expect these activities to raise the political tension between the states
in dispute who would want to preserve their future rights to exploit their natural resources. The
reasoning of the ICJ was followed later in Guyana vs Cote d’ivoire when the tribunal declared
the seismic surveys occurring in the disputed area as legally permissible due to their lower
threshold of impact.137

b. Permissible Unilateral Activities in Disputed Maritime Zones
The limitations of the permitted economic activities in disputed waters does not however
diminish the scope of the economic activities occurring and susceptible to occurring in disputed
waters. The offshore oil industry for example heavily relies on exploration activities. It requires
an advanced level of technology and huge amounts of investments. The information that comes
out of exploration is of huge value to any upcoming exploitation of a maritime zone. In this
respect, petroleum contracts usually divide operations to two separate phases.
The first one is the exploration phase, which takes a long time to be achieved. The second
is the exploitation phase. In many cases, companies operating in disputed zones make the choice
of performing the first phase pending the resolution of the dispute.
Another growing field of maritime economic exploitation is the wind energy field. The
progress realized in the offshore wind farms now permits to establishment of these farms in
waters beyond the territorial waters where the density of winds is more adequate for the
functioning of the farms. Moreover, windfarm activities are related to non-living (and nonexhaustible) resource, which makes them less susceptible to hampering the reach of a final
agreement. The last decade has also witnessed the rise of a touristic exploitation of maritime
zones. In the disputed waters of the South China Sea, the Chinese government has built a set of
installation and artificial islands and it has started to organize a tourism industry around these
installations and islands.138
A last example is the fishery industry. Despite being mainly preserved from foreign
investments in practically all states, few states have started to allow the participation of foreign
investors in this segment by establishing harvesting factories on the shores to process the
production of fishing operations. Fisheries being a renewable non-exhaustible resource is also
less susceptible of being framed of deprivation contesting states from their (possible) future
sovereign rights.
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It is hard to establish a complete list of economic activities susceptible to occurring in
deep maritime zones; however, the above-mentioned examples show that the range and scope of
activities susceptible of being permitted even in disputed zones is still broad. That is of course
acknowledging that it is impossible to make a preset list of permissible activities, each case
should be assessed according to its own individual circumstances.
Accordingly, the primary determination should be whether the economic activity is
permitted to be conducted unilaterally in a disputed zone. The substantive criteria of such
determination are whether the activity irreparably damages the environment or the sovereign
rights of contesting states. A seismic exploration for example should not qualify as hampering
the reach of a delimitation or agreement since it does not cause damage or change to the
environment. An exploitation drilling on the other hand could constitute an irreparable damage
to the contesting state’s sovereign rights if later attributed the disputed zone.
Obviously, force majeure does not necessarily lead to the termination of the obligation or
of the contract. Rather it may lead only to its suspension if the event has a temporary nature.
Also, the contract’s suspension or the obligation’s suspension period, requires a reasonable
envisaged suspension period which does not discharge the contract of its substance and its value
for the parties. The extent to which the period of suspension is reasonable, is a relative matter
related to each case. The parties may agree on the periods and the mechanisms of this suspension
-providing the notice, the agreement and the periods. Further, force majeure might be partial and
not holistic. Meaning, it may lead to the impossibility of a contractual obligation but necessarily
to the totality of the contract. In such cases, the force majeure event gives rise to the suspension
of a part of the obligations for a temporary period that ends with the situation of force majeure.
An example is production-sharing agreements. In this type of agreement, the economic
operation is divided into two consecutive and consequent phases.139 The first one is the
exploration phase and the second one is the exploration phase. Despite being economically
inseparable in certain cases, each phase is susceptible of being performed independently. A rise
of a temporary force majeure can lead to a suspension of the second phase while permitting the
first one. It is common that in disputed zones, companies and states start the exploratory
activities until the prevention to continue the second part ends to gain time and money. In the
Cote d’ivoire / Ghana dispute for instance, the operator (Tullow Petroleum) and the host state
(Ghana) decided to continue in its exploratory drillings until the tribunal had rendered its
decision on delimitation.140

4. Maritime Zonal Dispute as a Legal Impossibility
From an abstract perspective, the impossibility arising from a maritime dispute as
previously presented is a legal impossibility. The notion of impossibility as recognized in
national laws is flexible enough to encompass cases of impossibility going from acts of god and
material impossibility to relative impossibility and virtual ones, such as legal impossibility.
Contractual clauses seem to follow a relaxed approach to the notion of impossibility. As
mentioned above the notions of relative, temporary and partial impossibility are not foreign to
the construction of force majeure clauses in contracts. Moreover, virtual impossibility or legal
impossibility seems to be an inherent element of the definition of force majeure in all relevant
contractual clauses. The lesser degree of resistibility, the lesser the threshold of conduct imposed
on the parties. The lesser the degree of impossibility leave to assume that force majeure in this
context encompasses virtual impossibility including economic and legal.
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The question however is more complicated in the realm of general international law /
BITs. It is not clear if virtual impossibility falls within the scope of force majeure in customary
law or not. The reluctance of international tribunals in elaborating on questions like economic
impossibility makes it complicated to deduce a jurisprudential approach to this subject. The ILC
draft articles have not made things easier by using the adjective “MATERIAL” to describe the
required impossibility.
Most BITs do not contain specific provisions regarding force majeure or circumstances
precluding wrongfulness in general. Hence, the applicability of customary international law,
which makes it uncertain that, a case of legal impossibility could reach a positive end in a treaty /
BIT claim. However, the USA model of NPM is quite evocative in this respect. It is possible that
the illustrative list contained in this BIT could indicate that a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness in the form of force majeure should be approached according to the characteristics
of the events provided by the list. Those events are flexible and wide enough to encompass cases
of virtual impossibility, namely legal impossibility.

III. PROVISIONAL MEASURES AND
EVENTS OF FORCE MAJEURE

UNFAVORABLE

DELIMITATION

AS

The precedent part has examined the interaction between each element of the force majeure
concept and the elements of a maritime zonal dispute. It has shown that a host sate’s ability to
handle its international maritime disputes is highly dependent on the construction of the force
majeure concept contained in its investment agreements and contracts. However, practice reveals
that despite the legal qualifications and the material implications of a maritime contestation, an
investment might well survive the occurrence of the dispute and continue to operate despite the
existence of an ongoing dispute. This could be due to several reasons such as the political or
military implication of the investor’s home state141 or a political environment inciting the parties to
simply omit to trigger the force majeure clause.142 This does not mean that the investment is
immune from facing legal implications arising out of the contestation, which can also have the
effect of crippling the investment and rendering its performance legally impossible. This part
examine examines the main legal obstacles an investment might confront in disputed zones,
provisional orders and final delimitation agreement. The peaceful resolution of a maritime dispute
supposes that states can resolve their disputes through the reliance on a third party’s decision or
their capability to negotiate a mutual agreement.
This part will demonstrate that rigidly applied, the concept of force majeure can operate as an
obstacle to the adherence of host states to the mechanisms of peaceful resolution of disputes through
international instances. It is also susceptible of discouraging states from negotiating delimitation
agreements in an effective and constructive attitude. However, a contextualist approach to the force
majeure concept can enhance the chances of accepting the jurisdiction of international tribunals to
resolve maritime disputes and the reaching of delimitation agreements.

A. Provisional Measures
As the appellation indicates, provisional measures aim to ensure that a provisional
regime protects the potential rights of the parties. This purpose coincides with that of articles
74(3) and 83(3) of the UNCLOS, the similarities between the substantive conditions of
provisional measures and the substantive obligations of states in disputed maritime zones are
striking.
See With ExxonMobil to Drill, US Navy Sending Ships, Marines Off Cyprus – The National Herald, ,
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The function of provisional measures in the realm of a dispute regarding the sovereign
rights of states in a contested zone is to recalibrate state’s behavior in accordance with their
obligations prescribed by articles 74(3) and 83(3). The obligation of states not to hamper or
jeopardize the reaching of a final agreement have been extensively interpreted by tribunals as
an obligation to refrain from inflicting irreparable damage to sovereign rights of other states.143
The “irreparable damage” criteria as elaborated in the Aegean case144 explains the authority of
the findings of the Aegean Sea case tribunal.145
The previous assessment indicates that from a substantive standpoint, the conditions
upon which a provisional measure / order would qualifies as a force majeure are not different
than what was examined earlier.
However, assessing the predictability of a provisional measure can be more complicated
than assessing the predictability of a contestation. In addition to the substantive criteria
addressed above, the question of the jurisdiction of a tribunal or instance to issue a provisional
order is crucial to determine the predictability of such a measure. Generally, the lack of
competence to issue a provisional order reduces the predictability of such order. On the other
hand, the existence of a competent instance having jurisdiction to issue a provisional order
enhance the possibility and predictability element.
However, despite being portrayed as a legal body heavily drawn onto compulsory
jurisdiction146, the jurisdictional schema to order a provisional measure in the realm of a
maritime dispute entails complications that deserve to be examined.
The obligations of conduct in respect to the occurrence of force majeure is also relevant
in cases where the host state accepts the jurisdiction of the tribunal subsequent to the
occurrence of the dispute. The force majeure event cannot be triggered by the behavior of the
claimant party. The question that arises is whether a provisional measure hampering the
investment is attributable to the host state, and therefore prevents it from claiming force
majeure because it has accepted the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
1.

The Function and Purpose of Provisional Measures
Article 290 of the UNCLOS provides that “If a dispute has been duly submitted to a
court or tribunal which considers that prima facie it has jurisdiction under this Part or Part XI,
section 5, the court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers
appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the
dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.”147
As indicated, the main purpose of the provisional measures is to preserve the rights
claimed by a party when according to the circumstances; the nonprescription of these measures
can impair these rights or leads to the aggravation of the dispute.148 Provisional measures are
ought to guarantee the serenity of an international adjudication by assuring the parties that their
claimed rights will not become impossible to enjoy by the time a decision is made 149 or that a
party might not instaur a “fait accompli” during the procedure.150
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The provisional measures prescribed by a tribunal can take the form of a prohibition to
conduct certain activities151 , to suspend ongoing activities152, to refrain from divulging
information related to the ongoing activities to third parties153 or to limit activities.154 The key
question upon which the nature of the provisional measures depends is what harm the claimant
is afraid of suffering155 and the adequacy of the requested provisional measure to deal with this
potential harm. For instance, in Cote D’Ivoire vs Ghana the claimant argued that it could suffer
considerable and irreparable damage if it cannot conserve the exclusivity of the information
obtained from the exploration activities, which led the tribunal to prescribe a prohibition upon
Ghana to divulge the results of the exploration operation.156

2.

The Question of Jurisdiction to Order a Provisional Measure and Predictability
A preliminary requirement to the admissibility of a provisional measure request is the
existence of a dispute that is duly submitted to the court or the tribunal. By consequence, a
request of a provisional measure is organically related to the existence of a dispute duly
submitted regardless of the stage of the proceedings.157 The word “dispute” has a double
meaning in this respect. The First is the legal sense of the word dispute.158 Accordingly, a
litigatory relationship must exists between the parties according to the provisions of the
convention and the statute of the court or tribunal. This relationship is established based on the
prior ratification either of UNCLOS or by special agreement. Second, there must be
convergence on the interpretation of the provisions of the convention. A dispute related to the
interpretation or application of a body of law other than UNCLOS would fail to qualify as a
“dispute” in the sense of article 290 unless an incidental jurisdiction is established.
The second sense overlaps in some respect with the condition of prima facie jurisdiction.
The court or tribunal must satisfy that it has a prima facie jurisdiction upon the dispute
submitted to it. It has been argued that the threshold of jurisdiction in the realm of provisional
measures is lower that what is required in general jurisdiction.159 Therefore, it is not
unconceivable that a court declares a prima facie jurisdiction to find later that it lacks
jurisdiction to hear the dispute.160
UNCLOS has a clear penchant for compulsory jurisdiction.161 However, exceptions to
the compulsory jurisdiction have been reiterated in article 290 in order to deflate a state’s
reservations to a constraining regime. Accordingly, disputes about delimitation and the
management of living resources are excluded from the compulsory regime instaured by article
290.
The recurrent question for the purpose of this study is the question of jurisdiction to hear
a case concerning the sovereign rights entitled by articles 74 and 83. If the host state is a
member of UNCLOS and has declared an exemption from the compulsory jurisdiction of
delimitation cases, a tribunal constituted under UNCLOS would still have jurisdiction to hear a
dispute related to the exercise of sovereign rights in a disputed zone, and potentially the
jurisdiction to order provisional measures.
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A zonal maritime dispute is primarily a dispute between states on the interpretation or
the application of the provisions of articles 74(1) and 83(1) UNCLOS. This dispute entails and
encompasses complications regarding the management of state’s sovereign rights in the
disputed zone, the latter not being necessarily addressed by the exception to compulsory
jurisdiction. This corollary between multiple (issues) creates doubts as to whether a tribunal
would have jurisdiction over a dispute covered by the “exempting “clause that is linked to
another non-exempted dispute.
The case law provides us with contradictory indications in this respect. In the Chagos
MPA case, the tribunal adopted a progressive approach to the interpretation of article 297(3)
which excluded the management of living resource from compulsory settlement, by ruling that
the question of fishery management despite being initially outside the scope of compulsory
jurisdiction, could well fall within this scope as an environmental dispute according to article
297(1).162 A similar reasoning was adopted in the South China Sea case where the tribunal163
responded to the Philippine request to decide whether low tide elevation rocks would qualify as
an island capable of generating an EEZ in the sense of UNCLOS. Despite being related to the
maritime delimitation dispute of the parties which should be outside the scope of compulsory
jurisdiction and despite that the qualification of “island” would have a direct impact of the
parties maritime claims, the tribunal considered that Philippines request was built upon a
dispute regarding the interpretation of an article of the convention that is not exempted from
compulsory jurisdiction, regardless of the effects that would have on the delimitation dispute164
( delimitation and historic titles).
The approach followed by the tribunals indicates that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is
assessed based on the source of the legal claim or dispute regardless of its link with a
potentially (exempted) dispute. Accordingly, the link between the claim and the (exempted)
dispute should not prevent the tribunal from ruling on the case.
In the case of articles 74(3) and 83(4), it is clear that a dispute regarding the management
of state’s sovereign rights in a disputed zone is directly related to a dispute regarding the
interpretation or application of maritime delimitation rules.
A contractionist approach entails putting these kinds of disputes within the scope of
delimitation disputes and prohibiting the jurisdiction to rule over such disputes, hence
decreasing the predictability of the occurrence of a provisional measure.
An expansionist approach on the other hand would argue that the sovereign rights of
states in maritime zones are governed by articles 74(3) and 83(3), which separates their origin
from that of delimitation provisions originating from articles 74(1) and 83(1). Moreover, a
decision on the management of sovereign rights in a disputed zone cannot be said to influence
the outcome of the dispute. As established, the regime managing the sovereign rights in a
disputed zone is inherently of a provisional nature. The tacit or explicit arrangement and the
policy of states regarding the exercise of their sovereign rights should not have an effect of the
final delimitation. Articles 74(3) and 83(3) clearly provide that provisional arrangement are
without effect on the final delimitation. Moreover, the jurisprudence is settled on the rule
saying that resource and their management are not an indicator as such to the existence of an
agreement onto a maritime boundary.
In assessing the “jurisdiction” issue in respect to predictability, it is arguable that the
ratification of UNCLOS makes the occurrence of a provisional measure an anticipated legal
event. The declaration of a host state regarding exceptions to compulsory jurisdiction is not a
reason for diminishing the probability of such an event to happen. The degree of predictably of
a legal event such as a provisional measure would depend on the requirements of the governing
law of the investment. Unpredictability is enhanced if the host state is not a signatory of the
UNCLOS.
162

Alan Boyle, UNCLOS DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE USES AND ABUSES OF PART XV 24, 192.
constituted pursuant to article 287 annex VII
164
Yuki Morimasa, How do the compulsory dispute settlement procedures of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea deal with disputes concerning land sovereign issues? 49, 26–31.
163

The degree of unpredictability decreases if the host state is a signatory of the UNCLOS,
the declaration of an exception (of delimitation disputes) should not have an effect in this
respect. Finally, the occurrence of a provisional measure becomes highly predictable if the host
state has made no reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction in the LOSC.

3.

Subsequent Jurisdiction and the Element of Exteriority
In some cases, the investment might take place in a host state that is not bound by the
provisions of UNCLOS, yet at later stage, the host state might accept the jurisdiction of an
international tribunal-giving rise to a provisional measure hampering the investment. This is
the case in the Ghana vs Cote d’Ivoire dispute. At the time of the conclusion of several
contracts between foreign investors and Ghana, the latter has previously triggered (the
exceptionality clause) in 15 December 2009 to remove delimitation disputes from the scope of
compulsory jurisdiction.165 However, in December 2014 Ghana signed a special agreement
with Cote d’ivoire accepting to submit their maritime dispute to a special chamber of ITLOS.
Later on, the tribunal ordered a moratorium on Ghana’s activities in the disputed area upon
Ivorian request of provisional measure. The tribunal’s order has led to the suspension of
several ongoing activity occurring in the contracted area.166 The tribunal’s order being a
temporary undetermined legal obstacle before the continuity of the investments could have
been the basis of a force majeure claim by any of the parties if it met the relevant requirements.
However, the problem arising from this specific situation it the question of whether the
provisional order can be considered the result of Ghana’s conduct and therefore preventing
Ghana from claiming force majeure.
It is a general characteristic of force majeure that it should not be the result of a party’s
conduct. However, the degree of attributability of the force majeure event to a party’s conduct
varies from a clause to another.
As illustrated earlier, an absolutist approach to exteriority means that the party should
not have contributed to the occurrence of the force majeure event nor directly neither partially.
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that Ghana would have been unable to claim force majeure
in respect to the provisional order of the court.
A relaxed approach diminishing the required threshold such as the contract’s clause
requiring the force majeure to be beyond the “reasonable control” of the parties should result in
a different outcome. Accordingly, the conduct of the parties should be assessed objectively
taking into consideration the normal expected conduct in a given situation. The effect of the
contribution of this conduct in the occurrence of the force majeure event should be attenuated
by the reasonability and normality of the conduct. In the Ghana example, the question is
whether the Ghana agreement to peacefully resolve the maritime dispute with Cote d’ivoire
through international adjudication is beyond the normal conduct states are supposed to follow
in this context and should the presence of foreign investment in the disputed area be an
obstacle before Ghana opting for such adjudication.
The tribunal in RSM vs Grenada has addressed the question of resorting to litigation in
the context of assessing Grenada’s conduct regarding force majeure. RSM claimed that
Grenada failed to adopt the proper conduct towards the removal of the force majeure by
refusing to bring Trinidad and Venezuela to litigation. Grenada on the other hand countered
RSMs claim by emphasizing both legal and political reasons according to which litigation
seemed unreasonable from the Grenadian view. The tribunal accepted Grenada’s claim,
affirming that resorption to international adjudication isn’t an international obligation and that
the appreciation of such policy shouldn’t be transferred from the discretion of the sovereign
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state to a private party. Moreover, the tribunal seems to have acknowledged the reasonability of
Grenada’s omission to resort to litigation for reasons of public policy of the state. 167
Contrarily, it can be said that the choice of a sovereign state to settle its disputes by the
means permitted by international law including litigation seems like a normal conduct.
Assuming that the maritime dispute originated from different interpretations of legal and
factual rules, it is assumed that both contesting states have good reasons to believe in their
righteous entitlement to their claimed zone. It also seems a reasonable conduct to try to
establish these entitlements through international adjudication as a mean of the peaceful
settlement of disputes. Accordingly, a contextualist interpretation of the force majeure concept
should assume that the parties have anticipated the possibility of an international adjudication.

B. Unfavorable Delimitation
The regime governing the exploitation of disputed maritime zones is meant to be
temporary, hence the appellation “provisional”. Even though maritime delimitation can take
decades to be achieved and even though states might opt to instaure a provisional arrangement
that could last for decades, maritime boundary disputes ought to be resolved. The delimitation
of a disputed maritime zone might become fatal to an investment if the delimitation turns out to
be unfavorable to the host state by transferring its location to the definitive maritime zones of
the contesting state.168 On the one hand, the lack of a contractual framework between the
investor and the contesting state deprive the former from an elementary layer of protection as a
foreign investor. On the other hand, presuming that a BIT exists between the investor’s home
state and its new host, it is doubtful that a BIT would encompass investments made in the
territory of the contesting state of a disputed maritime zone. Therefore, it is also possible that
the investment also loses the protection of this international instrument. The problem is more
acute if the hampering of the investment in such case is found to be due to the conduct of the
initial host sate by virtue of a delimitation agreement transferring the investment to the
geographical scope of the contesting state.
Delimitation agreements usually follow the criteria found in adjudicational delimitation.
Accordingly, the equidistance approach occupies a major position as to the guidelines of
delimitation agreements especially in the case of opposite coasts.169 Other geographical factors
have minorly influenced the delimitation agreements such as the configuration of coasts170,
proportionality,171the presence of islands,172 straight baselines173 geological factors,174 . Nongeographical factors such as economic factors have also minorly influenced delimitation
agreement.
It would be unrealistic to think that the presence of confirmed or potential resources is
absent from the background of a delimitation negotiation, the whole purpose of maritime
delineation being the management of natural resources. Accordingly, there is no reason to
assume that the presence of resources has not played a role in the negotiations that preceded the
agreement despite not being a legal criterion to delimitation. Interestingly thought, despite
being affirmatively not a factor of the law of maritime delimitation, the presence of natural
resources has directly and explicitly determined the frame of some delimitation agreements.
The presence of an investment in a given maritime area is probably an indication of the
presence of valuable resources; it is therefore not strange that a negotiation on delimitation
encompasses the invested area.
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Moreover, the complexity and longevity of maritime border disputes can be an incentive
for states involved in the dispute to make concessions from their original positions in return for
the resolving of the dispute

1.

Unfavorable Delimitation and Foreseeability
Most maritime delimitations occur through the process of agreement. Delimitation
through agreement might enjoy a certain preference for states who are not keen on involving
third parties regarding the settlement of their maritime boundaries.175 Delimitation through
adjudication might also be perceived as unpredictable and uncontrollable in cases where the
application of delimitation rules do not lead to a clear cut result in demarcating the contesting
state’s claims.176 In fact, articles 74 (1) and 83(1) clearly emphasize the prominence of
agreements as the primary mean of boundary dispute settlement.
As one commentator has observed, one possible explanation for the prominence of
delimitation agreements in force, is the easiness of these cases in comparison with those that
have not been settled yet.177 Accordingly, it can be argued that the easiness and clearness of a
maritime zonal dispute is more susceptible of being resolved by means of agreement, hence
increasing the predictability of the occurrence of a negotiation process and potentially an
agreement. This remains depending on the circumstances surrounding each dispute, which can
negate this effect.
Another element that might indicate the possibility of an engagement in negotiations to
delimit disputed maritime boundaries is the lack of jurisdiction of a competent instance to
adjudicate onto the dispute. Dispute settlement through adjudication is one of the means to
resolve maritime boundaries disputes. Its absence as a viable alternative by the parties
enhances the predictability of the parties resolving to negotiations and agreement. A nuanced
view should also be taken in consideration if the surrounding circumstances invites it.
The predictability of the transfer of sovereignty as an element of force majeure becomes
more persistent if the investment is established in a disputed zone where the host state is
engaged in a negotiation process with a contesting state at the time the investment is made.
Unless otherwise proven, the ongoing negotiations presume the host state’s readiness to draw
back from its initial claim. Accordingly, the transfer of sovereignty should become more or less
predictable with an investment established in the near proximity of the equidistance line. For
instance, both Guyana and Venezuela have been engaged in a long-standing maritime dispute
going back to 1899. The negotiations between the two contesting states has been on and off for
nearly fifty years.178 If an investor decided to establish the investment in near proximity of the
median line separating the contesting claims knowing the existence of negotiations, it can be
assumed that the investor has born the risk of an unfavorable delimitation.179

2.

Delimitation Agreements and “Sphere of Control”
Generally, the irresistibility of a legal impossibility constituting a force majeure resides
primarily in the fact that the occurrence of the legal situation (promulgation of a law, legal
situation) is independent from the party’s (will) and that the parties have no means to overcome
the legal impossibility.
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This scenario assumes a simple case clear of relevant geographical or non-geographical circumstance for
the purpose of making an illustration.

As presented in the case of provisional measures and the occurrence of a maritime
contestation, the source of the legal regime and its effects emanates from a body of laws that
are initially independent from the parties will. In some cases, the means of overcoming the
legal impossibility resulting from such cases exist but the law that imposes the impossibility is
independent of the parties will.
The situation is different in case of a delimitation agreement since the legal event in
question such as the transfer of sovereign rights is the act of the host state / party and therefore
attributed to it. A delimitation agreement depends of the choice and appreciation of the state of
its own interests, there is room for arguing that in such case a state / party should bear the
consequences of its sovereign actions in respect to a third parties’ interest.
However, such interpretation of the notions of irresistibility and control can hamper the
objectives of articles 74 and 83. The interim regime governing the exploitation of resources in
disputed areas in meant to balance between the need to use resources and the peaceful
settlement maritime disputes. Accordingly, the exploitation of resources should not become a
reason for contesting state’s inability to reach a final agreement. It is presumed that a
negotiation in good faith entails party’s willingness to abandon their initial positions to reach a
middle ground of agreement. As the ICJ provided in North Sea case, the parties of a
negotiation “are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are
meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position
without contemplating any modification of it”180
It is obvious that the presence of resources can be a determinant factor in the realm of
maritime delimitation agreements. The economic harm that a host state / party may encounter
in the event of a transfer of sovereign rights might act as a deterrent for the state to negotiate
with a readiness to give up some of its initial position. The whole purpose of negotiation in that
case becomes frustrated. Moreover, it might be in the best interest of the host state to accept a
concession of a disputed zone in exchange for an equivalent concession from the contesting
state or for the sake of reaching a final agreement pursuant to the objectives of UNCLOS.
A more relaxed interpretation of the notion of (irresistibility and control) is envisageable according to the usage of the wording (reasonable control) in long-term investment
contracts as a required threshold. The reasonability of the state/party’s conduct will of course
remain an objective question to be appreciated according to the circumstances of each case.
However, taking into consideration the characteristic and complexity of a given maritime
dispute might provide a basis for arguing the reasonability of the host state’s conduct.

3.

Unfavorable Delimitation and the Element of Irresistibility
If an event of force majeure occurs, the parties are under an obligation to overcome the
effects of the event qualified as such. Some agreements reiterate this obligation by providing
for detailed provisions on the way and means parties should overcome the effects of the force
majeure. Even if an agreement omits to explicitly provide for this obligation, it remains the
positive façade of the notion of irresistibility. Accordingly, it has been ruled that the blockade
of the Suez Canal could not be considered as a force majeure because the transporter could
overcome this event by using another maritime path despite being more onerous.181
Practice has shown that a delimitation agreement transferring the sovereign rights of a
maritime zone does not necessarily entail the ignoration of economic resource and interests of
private third parties. In the 1909 Grisbadarna case , the Permanent Court of arbitration in the
maritime delimitation between Sweden and Norway opted for a shift of the median line
between the two parties, taking in consideration the presence of third parties interest that would
be transferred to Norway if the median line is confirmed according to the latter’s proposal.182
This jurisprudence has been abandoned since and it is settled now that the presence of resource
is not as such a legal factor of maritime delimitation.
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Despite economic resources having a minor impact on delimitation agreements in
general,183 the presence of economic resources and the interests of third parties have been taken
in consideration in some maritime delimitation agreements in several forms.184 For instance,
the 1988 agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf between Sweden and the Soviet
Union if each party is entitled to a specific tonnage of fisheries in area falling within the
jurisdiction of each other party.185 In 1993, as a deblocage of their long lasting maritime
dispute186, Senegal and Guinea Bissau opted for establishing a joint development venture to
explore and exploit the resources of their disputed maritime zone.187 The agency created by this
agreement has been given exclusive titles to the resources of the disputed zone as well an
independent legal personality.
Finally in the 2000 Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea agreement concerning their maritime
boundaries,188 it is provided that if the maritime boundary “ run through any field of
hydrocarbon deposits so that part of the field lies on the Nigerian side of the boundary and part
lies on the Equatorial Guinea side, the Contracting Parties shall seek to reach appropriate
unitization arrangements for each such field”.189 It is also provided that “ the Contracting
Parties shall authorize the relevant government entities in association with the relevant
concession holders to establish appropriate unitization and other arrangements to enable this
area to be developed in a commercially feasible manner”190
As shown from the preceding examples, the submission of an investment to the scope of
the sovereignty of a contesting state (potentially hampering the investment) is not a fatality in
respect of maritime delimitation. It exists several approaches to provide the investment a
proper protection and to protect the interests of private parties. The examples of the Senegalese
agreements show that the parties haven’t necessarily put the accent onto a definitive
delimitation which facilitated the creation of the joint venture. However, in the Nigerian
agreement, the parties have opted for a definitive demarcation of their maritime boundaries.
Nevertheless, that did not prevent them from guaranteeing the stability of the private interests
lying on the border line as explicitly mentioned in their agreement. Accordingly, it can be
argued that the impact of an unfavorable delimitation can be resisted or avoided by means
already experimented in international practice. The obligation to resist or avoid the effect of an
unfavorable delimitation remains however an obligation of conduct, each case according to the
surrounding circumstances

4.

Unfavorable Delimitation as an Event of Force Majeure
A rigid interpretation of the concept of force majeure in the realm of maritime
delimitation agreements could hamper states ability and margin of maneuver to conclude such
agreements.
Rigidly approached, the outcome of a boundary delimitation is initially dependent on the
host state’s will either by reaching an agreement or by leaving the faith of the dispute to a third
party. According to this interpretation, there is no reason to assume that the host state accepted
the establishment of a private investment while intending to concede its maritime claim.
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The host state’s acceptance of a private investment in its claimed maritime zone should
be a decreasing factor to the probability and predictability of the former to concede its claimed
zone. Reaching a delimitation agreement is not an obligation under international law.
Accordingly, the conclusion and the outcome of the agreement are not only within the control
of the host state but the effects resulting from the agreement could be attributed to the host
state’s conduct.
On the other hand, a relaxed approach to the concept of force majeure would enhance
state’s ability to balance between the purposes of peacefully settling its maritime disputes and
the preservation of investor’s interests. As shown, a relaxed interpretation of the concept of
force majeure still retains a degree of predictability to the host state’s conduct. It also still
requires that the circumstances surrounding a given dispute reasonably justify the conclusion of
an unfavorable agreement. Moreover, several mechanisms exist to protect the integrity of the
investment in case of an unfavorable delimitation. This relaxed approach is sustained by the
clauses of force majeure found in most investment agreements and several NPM clauses.

CONCLUSION
The concept of force majeure is a flexible concept. It is susceptible to being narrowed down
to a very limited scope that encompasses a limited number of events, but it is also susceptible of
being broadened to encompass unlimited possibilities. The scope of the force majeure concept
depends on whether it is built upon a subjective or an objective approach. The more subjective and
contextualist it is, the more ability it has, to encompass events which would not traditionally fall
within its scope. As a doctrine construed to protect the debtor from perturbations susceptible of
occurring during the contractual relationship, it is in the interest of the debtor to widen the scope of
this doctrine.
The main problem this research examined is the problem of the revocation of a state’s
permission for a foreign investment to operate in a subsequently disputed maritime zone. In this
schema, the state is the debtor of the obligation to permit the investment to operate. This research
established that to determine if a maritime contestation is tantamount to an event of force majeure,
the dispute must be deconstructed and analyzed according to the multiple elements of the concept of
force majeure. Once this is done, the outcome of this equation would vary according to the
approach followed in evaluating whether a force majeure exists or not. An objective analysis of the
concept of force majeure would probably tighten up its scope and may potentially be a burden on
state’s margin of maneuver to handle its maritime disputes.
The collision between the necessities of foreign investments protection on the one hand and
the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes on the other may hamper the development of disputed
maritime zones as conceived by the UNCLOS III. However, practice have shown that international
contracts followed by international investment agreements tend to adopt a subjective approach to
the force majeure concept. Accordingly, the concept of force majeure starts to encompass situations
that would not have normally been encompassed by the objective approach. Hence, giving host
states more freedom in claiming force majeure for the purpose of peacefully settling their maritime
dispute, abiding with judicial orders and entering into maritime delimitation agreements. In the
meantime, investors are not left without safety measures to cope with the expansion of host state’s
ability to claim force majeure. The outcome of a successful force majeure invocation is not
necessarily the end of the investment.
Partial and temporary suspension of the agreement is well elaborated in national, international
law, international contracts usually contain elaborated procedures governing the post-force majeure
phase allowing them to enter into a renegotiation of their agreements and States are still expected to
look after the investment’s interest in case of a delimitation agreements. It is therefore safe to argue
that the balance or the imbalance in the host state – investor relation within a force majeure schema
is highly dependent on the approach taken to address the force majeure concept.

